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In the United States, public health insurance programs cover over 90 million individuals.  Changes
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Protection and Affordable Care Act, may have large effects on physician behavior.  This study finds
that following the implementation of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, physicians decreased
the number of hours spent with patients, but increased their participation in the expanded program.
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findings are consistent with the predictions from a mixed-economy model of physician behavior with
public and private payers and also provide evidence of crowd out resulting from the creation of SCHIP.
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I.  Introduction 
  In the United States, public health insurance programs provide coverage to over 90 
million individuals (United States Census, 2010).  Due to the prominence of these programs in 
the healthcare sector, their expansion may have large effects on physician behavior such as labor 
supply.  For example, the recent health care reform debate in the United States culminated with 
the signing of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)—which is expected to, 
among other things, increase enrollment in public health insurance programs by 16 million 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2010).  Given the existing predictions of physician shortages, the 
expected increase in the utilization of medical services by these millions of newly insured 
Americans has generated concerns among policymakers and health professionals about the 
potential for dramatically longer waiting times for appointments, lower quality of care, and 
overloaded physician practices (AAMC, 2010). These concerns will only be magnified if public 
health insurance expansions decrease the labor supply of existing physicians.   
Any negative effects of decreased physician labor supply may be worse for Medicaid 
patients who are already covered by a program that is increasingly not accepted by physicians.  
Cunningham and May (2006) found that from 1996 to 2005 the percentage of physicians 
reporting no Medicaid patients (as defined by practice revenue) increased by 13 percent.  Over 
the same time period, the percentage of physicians reporting that they were not accepting new 
Medicaid patients increased from 19.4 to 21 percent. The increase was largest for physicians who 
reported receiving little revenue from Medicaid.   
It is, therefore, important to understand how large expansions of public health insurance 
programs affect physician labor supply and participation in the newly-expanded programs.  
However, there is little existing evidence about the impact of an increase in the size of a public 2 
 
insurance program on the behavior of physicians. The creation and implementation of the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in the 1990s provides an opportunity to 
investigate this question.  SCHIP was a partnership between federal and state governments 
intended to increase insurance coverage for low-income Americans under the age of 19. 
I apply the Sloan, Mitchell, and Cromwell (1978) model of a mixed economy with 
private and public payers to this question and predict that physicians affected by the 
implementation of SCHIP should decrease the quantity of medical services they provide and 
increase their participation in the public insurance program.  This results from the fact that, for a 
portion of the physicians who were not previously participating in the public insurance program, 
the implementation of SCHIP changes the marginal patient from one covered by private 
insurance to one covered by the lower-reimbursing government program. 
I test the predictions of this mixed economy model using a difference-in-differences (DD) 
identification strategy that exploits the practice patterns of different types of physicians. Because 
of the age limit for SCHIP beneficiaries (children under the age of 19), pediatricians were 
disproportionately affected by the new insurance program. Physicians in other specialties are 
used to control for secular trends and contemporaneous events that may have influenced the time 
path of outcomes.  To capture state level differences in program generosity which may affect 
physician behavior, I use the simulated SCHIP eligibility measure in Gruber and Simon (2008).   
In this analysis I use two different nationally-representative datasets. Each of these 
datasets has strengths and weaknesses with respect to this analysis.  The primary dataset for this 
analysis, the Community Tracking Study physician survey (CTS), contains data on physician 
hours spent on patient care, insurance acceptance patterns, and practice level revenue data.  In 
addition, this dataset also allows researchers to track a group of physicians over time and 3 
 
contains state identifiers—both of which are critical for the proposed identification strategy.  
However, the CTS does not contain any visit level data detailing the length of office visits or the 
number of diagnostic services performed—limiting my ability to investigate the mechanism by 
which physicians alter their labor supply in response to a public health insurance expansion.   
The second dataset, the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS), is a visit-
level survey of office-based physicians.  These data cover, among other things, physician 
demographics, patient insurance status, and the amount of time the physician spent with the 
patient.  However, this dataset does not contain state identifiers or provide the ability to track 
physicians over time.  It also has no practice level information about Medicaid acceptance or the 
hours worked by physicians.  These weaknesses decrease the precision of estimates of the effect 
of SCHIP. 
Implementing the DD strategy utilizing the state-based measures of simulated eligibility, 
I find that SCHIP decreased the number of hours spent on patient care.  In addition, this 
expansion of public health insurance increased the percentage of pediatricians that reported 
seeing any Medicaid patients, accepting new Medicaid patients, and the amount of revenue 
received from Medicaid.  Examining the visit-level data from the NAMCS, I find suggestive 
evidence that this decrease in labor supply comes from shorter visit lengths for Medicaid patients 
after the implementation of SCHIP—in particular, I find a decrease in the number of visits 
lasting more than 10 minutes (p-value < 0.10).   
Taken together, the above results support the predictions of the mixed economy model 
across several different outcomes including labor supply, accepting patients from the new public 
insurance program, and the amount of revenue received from the new program.  The consistency 4 
 
across these wide ranging outcomes, which are not intuitively connected through a means other 
than those proposed by the model, provides support for the totality of the findings.  
 
II.  The State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
SCHIP is a state-administered health insurance program financed jointly by state and 
federal governments.  Created as part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, it was intended to 
provide health insurance coverage to low-income children without health insurance who did not 
qualify for coverage under the income limits for traditional Medicaid.  The legislation gave states 
three options for creating a program.  States could enroll progressively higher income children in 
the existing Medicaid program, create a separate state insurance program, or implement a 
combination of these two approaches.  Separate SCHIP programs were allowed more flexibility 
in program rules.
1  Initial enrollments in the program grew quickly and by 1999 there were 2 
million children enrolled in the program (Herz, Fernandez, and Peterson, 2005).  As of 2009, the 
program covered 4.9 million children (Smith et al. 2010).   
 
III.  Previous Research on Physician Labor Supply and Medicaid Participation Decisions 
There are two main strands of research upon which this study builds.  The first analyzes 
the determinants of physician procedure intensity and labor supply.  There is a long theoretical 
literature studying the ability of physicians to induce demand for their services (Fuchs, 1978; 
Pauly, 1980; Dranove, 1988).  The essence of the induced demand model is that following a 
negative shock to earnings, doctors take advantage of the information asymmetry between 
                                                            
1 For a detailed description of the different structures of SCHIP programs see Allen (2007). 5 
 
physicians and their patients to increase the intensity of treatment.  To date, the empirical support 
for models of physician-induced-demand has been mixed.
2 
  The induced demand literature primarily addressed questions related to treatment 
intensity and revenue generating activities—not specifically labor supply (although the concepts 
are clearly correlated).  An outstanding question in the literature is: What is the effect of income 
shocks on the actual amount of labor supplied by physicians, as opposed to simply their revenue 
generating activities such as increased testing or referrals?  Enterline, McDonald, and McDonald 
(1973) interviewed random samples of Canadian physicians before and after the introduction of a 
universal health care program in Quebec.  In this context, physicians decreased their hours 
worked following the implementation of the universal health care program.  More recently, 
Staiger, Auerbach, and Buerhaus (2010) found that the observed decline in the reported number 
of hours worked for physicians from 1996 to 2008 was related to declines in physician fees. 
In addition to the literature describing physician-induced-demand and labor supply, this 
analysis builds on previous work estimating the physician Medicaid participation decision.  
Sloan, Mitchell and Cromwell (1978) provided one of the first models of physician participation 
in Medicaid.  Their mixed-economy model, which serves as the starting point for this paper, is 
described in detail below.  In addition to their theoretical contribution, the authors analyzed 
                                                            
2 Many of the original empirical tests of induced demand used two-stage least squares methods to estimate the effect 
of the supply of physicians on the demand of services (Fuchs, 1978; Cromwell and Mitchell, 1986).  The authors 
attempted to identify plausibly exogenous variation in the location decision of physicians, and then used this 
exogenous increase in supply to determine the effect on the consumption of medical services.  Dranove and Wehner 
(1994) highlighted potential econometric flaws in this approach and, as a falsification test, applied the same method 
to childbirth—an area where there is likely little induced demand.  The empirical approach still found an effect, 
casting doubt on the validity of earlier estimates.  A second strand of research into physician induced demand 
examined differences in diagnostic testing patterns based on physician ownership of the testing equipment—
physicians receive more revenue from each diagnostic test performed when they own the equipment.   Several 
authors have found the physician ownership of this equipment increases the utilization of these services (Hillman et 
al. 1990; Hillman et al., 1992; Crane, 1992; Mitchell and Scott, 1992).  Other authors have using quasi-experimental 
variation in physician income and found that physicians respond to income shocks by increasing treatment intensity 
(Gruber and Owings, 1996). 
 6 
 
survey data and found that factors which changed the relative reimbursement from the public 
program (either higher Medicaid fee schedules or lower reimbursement rates in the private 
market) were associated with increased participation in the government program.  Subsequent 
studies have also found that non-participation was sensitive to the reimbursements and 
administrative burdens involved with Medicaid (Garner, Liao, and Sharpe, 1979; Mitchell, 
1991), the size of the Medicaid eligible population in the geographic area (Mitchell, 1991), other 
community level characteristics such as per capita income and segregation (Perloff et al., 1997), 
and physician specific political believes (Sloan, Mitchell, and Cromwell, 1978). 
Two previous works have examined the effect of an increase in Medicaid eligibility on 
physician behavior.  Baker and Royalty (2000) found that the Medicaid expansions for pregnant 
women led to improved access to public clinics and hospitals.  Bronstein, Adams, and Florence 
(2004) examined physician participation responses to SCHIP in communities in Alabama (who 
expanded their existing Medicaid program) and Georgia (who implemented a separate state 
SCHIP program).  They found that physicians in Georgia increased their participation in the 
government insurance program while those in Alabama did not.  The analysis did not examine 
physician labor supply or practice patterns beyond public health insurance participation. 
 
IV.  The Effect of Public Health Insurance Expansions on the Private Insurance Market 
 
Policy makers are often concerned with “crowd out,” a phenomenon whereby many of 
the newly insured individuals following an expansion previously had coverage from another 
source.  Cutler and Gruber (1996) found that following the original Medicaid expansions, the 
uninsurance rate fell by only half as much as the increase in those covered by the expansion—a 
crowd out rate of 50 percent.  Building on this foundational study, a sizeable literature emerged 7 
 
estimating the presence and magnitude of crowd out following the expansion of public health 
insurance programs.  Using a variety of methods, authors have also found evidence of varying 
levels of crowd-out (Dubay and Kenney, 1996 and 1997; Yazici and Kaestner, 2000).  A second 
set of authors have used the longitudinal data in Survey of Income Program Participation (SIPP), 
and found little evidence of crowd out (Bloomberg et al., 2000; Card and Shore Sheppard, 2004;  
Ham and Shore Sheppard, 2005).  
These earlier studies estimated the crowd out from the original expansions to the 
Medicaid program in the late 1980s.  Since that time, a number of authors have examined the 
amount of crowd out from SCHIP.   Similar to Cutler and Gruber’s original work, LoSasso and 
Buchmueller (2004) found a crowd out rate of 50 percent.  More recently, Gruber and Simon 
(2008) found a crowd out rate from SCHIP of approximately 60 percent. 
 
V.  A Mixed-Economy Model of Physician Behavior 
  I apply the model of physician pricing in a mixed economy introduced by Sloan, 
Mitchell, and Cromwell (1978) to examine how physicians respond to an increase in the size of 
the government’s role in the insurance sector.  In this model, a physician faces two markets: one 
with privately-insured patients displaying a downward sloping demand curve and another with 
government-insured patients whose insurance pays a fixed reimbursement.  Physicians will 
accept patients in the private market until the marginal revenue equals the government 
reimbursement rate.  After that threshold, they will accept Medicaid patients until their marginal 
costs are equal to the Medicaid reimbursement rate.  For simplicity, the model traditionally 
assumes that physicians provide a homogenous good, which can be thought of as office visits or 
other standard medical services.  Extensions to this assumption are discussed below.    8 
 
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of this model. In the pre-expansion time 
period, the marginal revenue curve faced by a physician is the bold line composed of segments 
of the MRp curve (which represents the marginal revenue from treating privately insured or self-
pay patients) and the Pm curve (which represents the fixed reimbursement from the government 
insurance program).  In this case, physicians with marginal costs curves of MC and MC’ would 
not accept patients from the government market.
3 A physician with the curve in the 
neighborhood of MC’’, however, would see a mixture of both private and public sector patients.   
  The most obvious effect of the expansion of a public insurance program is an increase in 
the number of people covered by the program.  In addition, crowd-out will shift individuals from 
private to public health coverage.  Under the simplifying assumption that the crowd-out from 
SCHIP occurs randomly across insured individuals regardless of their pre-expansion willingness 
to pay for medical services, the effect on the private market can be seen by the inward rotation of 
the demand curve in Figure 1.
4  As a result, the post-expansion marginal revenue curve faced by 
the physician is constructed by the dotted lines marked by the curves MR’ and its intersection 
with the Pm curve.  
A physician’s response to this expansion is determined by his or her marginal cost curve 
and its intersection with the post-expansion marginal revenue curve.  Consider a physician with a 
marginal cost curve in the neighborhood of MC.  In the pre-expansion time period, this physician 
would not treat Medicaid patients.  After the expansion, this doctor’s behavior is predicted to 
change in two ways: (1) the physician will provide a lower quantity of medical services (moving 
                                                            
3 These physicians are easily observable in the CTS, where 12.33 percent of physicians report receiving no revenue 
from Medicaid and 19 percent of physicians report they are not accepting new Medicaid patients during the first 
panel of the survey.   
4 The simplifying assumption is reasonable and makes the following analysis more intuitive.  The qualitative 
predictions from the model will carry through under more complicated assumptions about the pattern of crowd out. 
The most realistic alternate assumption would be that the crowd out would primarily occur among individuals who 
had the least generous insurance coverage.  If this were to occur, the magnitude of the predicted effect would 
increase.  9 
 
from Q1 to Q2) and (2) the physician will begin to participate in the Medicaid program by 
accepting new Medicaid patients.  Physicians with marginal cost curves similar to MC’’ and 
MC’ should not alter their labor supply or Medicaid participation—they will continue to provide 
the same quantity of services and only see private patients because their marginal patient is not 
affected by the crowd out of individuals from the private market. Similarly, physicians with 
marginal costs similar to MC’’ should provide the same quantity of medical services.   
The mixed-economy model provides the following predictions regarding a public health 
insurance expansion:  
 
Prediction 1: The implementation of SCHIP should decrease the quantity of medical services 
provided by physicians with little pre-SCHIP Medicaid contact who treat patients under age 19.
5 
Prediction 1a: Holding their marginal cost curve constant, similar physicians who are 
already heavily participating in Medicaid should see no change in the quantity of medical 
services provided.  
Prediction 2:  The implementation of SCHIP should increase physician participation in Medicaid 
among physicians with little pre-SCHIP Medicaid contact who treat patients under age 19. 
Prediction 2a:  Similar physicians who are already heavily participating in the Medicaid 
program should not see any change in their participation or nonparticipation decision. 
Prediction 2b: The implementation of SCHIP should increase the percentage of revenue 
received from Medicaid patients for all physicians with patients under the age of 19.  
 
                                                            
5 In contrast, earlier studies examining induced demand suggest that physicians should increase, rather than 
decrease, the quantity of medical services provided in response an income shock such as the implementation of 
SCHIP. It is important to note, however, that the predictions of the mixed economy model above do not involve a 
shift in the labor supply curve of physicians.   
 10 
 
The model described above is used traditionally to describe the provision of office 
services or other discrete medical activities.  As is the case in this study, the quantity of medical 
services underlying the model above can also be extended to the broader concept of physician 
labor supply and hours worked.  In this case, the marginal revenue curve represents the expected 
reimbursements received by the physician for the next hour of work seeing a patient covered by 
either private or the public health insurance.  One might worry that physicians respond to 
exogenous changes in the insurance market by spending more time with each patient without 
billing them for the extra care. However, since physicians trade-off patient hours for leisure time, 
it is reasonable to assume they would not react to changes in the insurance market by providing 
more unreimbursed labor.  Under this assumption, the quantity of medical services in predictions 
(1) and (1a) can be thought of as hours spent with patients. 
It is important to note that the mixed economy model, in a situation of no crowd-out, 
predicts either no change (or an increase) in the number of hours worked by affected physicians 
and no effect on physician participation.  Without any crowd out, there is no inward rotation of 
the upper segment of the demand curve.  Instead, the increase in the number of individuals 
eligible for Medicaid comes primarily from the downward sloping portion of the demand curve 
below the reimbursement rate of Medicaid. In this case, only physicians with a marginal cost 
curve in the neighborhood of MC’’’, if they exist, should experience a change in reimbursements 
from their marginal patient.  Since this marginal patient was either uninsured or privately insured 
by an insurer paying reimbursement rates lower than those offered by Medicaid, there should be 
no decrease in labor supply or increase in program participation.  Therefore, finding results 
consistent with the model’s predictions serve as further evidence of crowd-out caused by SCHIP.   11 
 
  The mixed economy model was first developed to explain physician responses to the 
expansion of an existing fixed reimbursement government insurance program.  Given that this 
paper focuses on the creation of a new government program, it is natural to question the 
appropriateness of the model in this context.  As discussed above, states were given the freedom 
to implement SCHIP through various means.   Therefore, the magnitude of the effect of SCHIP 
on physician behavior may differ depending on the type of state-level implementation.
6  To 
address this concern, I provide separate analyses of samples containing all states and those 
containing states that increased their existing Medicaid program (hereafter referred to as 
“Medicaid expansion states”).  These states are also those most comparable to the model above.    
 
VI.  Data 
The primary dataset for this analysis is the Community Tracking Study Physician Survey 
(CTS).  This dataset is a nationally-representative random sample survey of physicians who 
provide at least 20 hours of direct patient care per week.  The sample is constructed from the 
master files of the American Medical Association and the American Osteopathic Association.  
Data from 60 communities are in the primary sample.  Among these communities, 12 are 
designated as “high intensity” locations that have a larger sample size.  To allow for national 
estimates, the data from the remaining 48 communities are supplemented with responses from a 
random national sample of physicians.  The dataset oversamples primary care physicians and 
                                                            
6 However, it is not the case that the absolute level of the Medicaid reimbursement rate in any particular state should 
drive, in isolation, the estimated response of physicians.  The estimated physician response to an expansion in this 
model is determined jointly by the distribution of marginal costs among physicians and the difference between the 
reimbursements received in the private market and those from Medicaid for patients who are crowded out.  States 
with high pre-expansion reimbursement rates should be expected to have a different concentration of physicians 
whose marginal costs place them at the participation margin relative to the concentration in states with lower pre-
expansion reimbursements.  There is no clear prediction about the size of this concentration based on the 
reimbursement rate and there no expectations about the direction of estimated direction of the effect of public health 
insurance expansions on physician labor supply based solely on the prevailing Medicaid reimbursement rate.  12 
 
includes non-federal physicians in a wide variety of practice settings including group practice, 
health clinics, hospitals, government facilities, and universities.      
The analysis uses the longitudinal component of three waves of the survey (1996-1997, 
1997-1998, and 2000-2001). The longitudinal component of each wave, which interviewed a 
smaller group of physicians, allows for the use of physician-level fixed effects. Moreover, I can 
estimate the heterogeneous effect of SCHIP based on the initial conditions of physicians (in 
particular their pre-expansion Medicaid participation).  The increase in information from the 
panel does, however, reduces to sample size to 5,060 physicians. 
The CTS contains data on the number of hours per week physicians spend on patient care 
and medical care, respectively.
7  Two questions pertain to participation in the Medicaid program: 
whether the physician is accepting “new Medicaid patients” and the percentage of the practice 
revenue from Medicaid.  Data on Medicaid reimbursement rates are available for 1993, 1998, 
and 2003 from the Urban Institute’s survey of physician fees (Zuckerman and Norton, 2000; 
Zuckerman et al., 2004).  These data are matched to the closest respective years in the CTS.
8   
The longitudinal component of the CTS allows physicians to be tracked over time and 
includes data about hours worked, insurance participation, and practice revenue.  However, the 
data contain no information on the number of patients seen, office visits provided, or services 
rendered during a visit.  In addition, the revenue data is at the practice rather than the physician 
                                                            
7 Physicians are asked for the number of hours spent on “medically related activities” and “direct patient care 
activities” during the last completed week of work.  Because the number of hours spent on patient care is a subset of 
all medical activities, the patient care variable is replaced with the medical care data if the reported number of hours 
on patient care exceeds the reported number for medical activities.  This occurred for only 0.14% of observations in 
the sample.  
8 These data are for the Medicaid fee for service (FFS) system.  Many Medicaid enrollees are now covered by 
managed care, but in general the reimbursements for the physicians under these systems are intended to be similar to 
those for the FFS system. A small number of observations were dropped in years when Medicaid fee data are not 
available for a physician.  13 
 
level.  I address this last limitation by using a subset of data from small group practices with one 
or two physicians—a group whose practice income is closely related to their personal income.    
Since the CTS does not contain a visit-level component, it is not possible to analyze the 
effect of SCHIP on visit-level practice patterns.  Therefore, I use data from the 1993-2002 
National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS).
9  NAMCS is a nationally-representative 
survey designed to provide information on the use of ambulatory medical care services in the 
United States.  The survey is administered by the Centers for Disease Control.  Similar to the 
CTS, the sampling frame from the NAMCS comes from the masterfiles of the AMA and the 
AOA, and contains physicians who are classified as providing “office-based, patient care.”  A 
random sample of these physicians is surveyed about their practice patterns during one randomly 
selected week. Data are collected on a variety of dimensions, including patient demographics, 
insurance status, and visit length.  
Because it does not contain longitudinal data, the NAMCS cannot be used to classify 
physicians based on their pre-expansion participation in Medicaid.  The survey also lacks state 
identifiers and, therefore, eliminates any ability to use the simulated eligibility measure of 
variation in SCHIP generosity—reducing the precision of estimates from these data.  
  
VII.  Empirical Strategy 
  The sample for the difference-in-differences analysis described below is composed of 
physicians with low pre-expansion participation in Medicaid.  From the CTS, I categorize 
physicians as low-Medicaid participators if the percentage of their revenue from Medicaid prior 
                                                            
9 This covers the period of five years of data before and after the creation of SCHIP. 14 
 
to SCHIP is less than or equal to five percent.  In the first panel of the CTS, 42 percent of all 
physicians and 31 percent of pediatricians fall into this category.
10   
To implement the difference-in-differences strategy, I must identify a treatment group of 
physicians who are affected by the public health insurance expansion and a control group of 
physicians whose practices were not affected by the policy change.  As discussed above, 
pediatricians, whose caseload is primarily composed of individuals under the age of 19, form the 
treatment group.  Identifying a comparison group requires selecting a set of physicians whose 
time path of outcomes would be, in the absence of the implementation of SCHIP, similar to that 
of pediatricians.  I use physicians in all other specialties as the control group.  
The lack of several periods of pre-treatment data in the CTS eliminates any direct tests of 
the parallel trends assumption underlying the DD identification strategy. Instead, I provide 
descriptive statistics by specialty to assess the similarity of these two groups.  Table 1 presents 
these statistics for the first panel of the CTS based on both specialty and pre-expansion Medicaid 
participation.  Focusing on the physicians reporting less than five percent of their pre-expansion 
practice revenue from Medicaid, pediatricians are most similar to internists and general 
practitioners.  They are less similar to physicians in the general specialties, surgical specialties, 
obstetrics and gynecology, and psychiatrists.  The outcome variables defining Medicaid 
participation appear in the last two columns.  On average, the percentage of revenue that 
pediatricians earn from Medicaid is similar to the physicians with “internal medicine” and 
                                                            
10 Data on the percentage of revenue from Medicaid have large concentrations of respondents clustered on round 
numbers (5, 10, 15). Ideally, I would identify physicians that report no pre-SCHIP revenue from Medicaid.  
However, in the first panel of CTS only 10 percent of pediatricians fall into this category.  Another possible measure 
of a low Medicaid provider is not accepting new Medicaid patients in the time period prior to the implementation of 
SCHIP.  The sample size of this group is larger than those reporting no revenue from Medicaid, but still relatively 
small, creating concerns of Type II errors.  Estimating the main results of the paper using either of these two 
alternate pre-SCHIP Medicaid participation produces estimates that are qualitatively similar in magnitude but less 
precise than those presented below.  The estimates are also robust to a range of other cutoffs between 5 and 10 
percent.    15 
 
“general and family practice” specialties. The outcomes of new Medicaid patient acceptance are 
also similar between the groups—though here there is a larger difference between pediatrics and 
general and family practice.  Pediatricians appear to work slightly fewer hours than physicians in 
other specialties, although this difference is small in magnitude.
11  
Without several periods of pre-expansion data on physicians, it is not possible to examine 
the pre-treatment trends of CTS outcomes by physician specialty.  However, using the NAMCS, 
I can examine differences in the trends between the treatment and control groups for visit-level 
outcomes such as amount of time spent with the physician.  Figure 2 shows the average duration 
of a physician visit by specialty between 1993 and 2002.  The dashed vertical line represents the 
implementation year of SCHIP for the vast majority of states.
12  Prior to the implementation of 
SCHIP, the average duration for each specialty followed generally similar trends.  After 1998, 
the average duration for a visit between physician types exhibits a sharp break.  Although they 
are for a different outcome and data, combined with the descriptive statistics in Table 1, these 
similar pre-treatment trends provide additional support for the DD strategy.   
Recall that states were given discretion over the size of their program, including setting 
income eligibility limits.  If physicians’ responses to the expansion of a public insurance 
expansion are related to the scale of the program, then this variation in program sizes provides 
valuable information. One naïve method of exploiting the state-based variation in program size 
classifies states by the number of children actually enrolled in the program.  This method, 
however, conflates other factors such as changes in local economic conditions with 
                                                            
11 The most striking way in which pediatricians differ from other physicians is that pediatricians are almost all 
primary care physicians.  While the main results of my analysis will pertain to a comparison group of all physicians, 
I also estimated results containing only primary care physicians.  This smaller sample size decreases precision but 
produces results of similar magnitude.  Finding similar results with this more limited control group provides 
suggestive evidence that using the full sample of physicians is not biasing the estimates.  
12 NAMCS does not contain state identifiers and, therefore, it is not possible to perfectly identify when SCHIP was 
implemented for each physician.  Examining data from the simulated eligibility measure, I find that 1998 marks the 
first year of a large increase in the percentage of children who are eligible for Medicaid and SCHIP in most states.   16 
 
programmatic changes such as income eligibility limits.  If local economic conditions are 
correlated with physician behavior, using enrollment as a measure program size would generate 
biased estimates of the effect of public health insurance expansions on supplier behavior.  
This problem in identifying state variation in the size of Medicaid expansions was first 
identified in Cutler and Gruber (1996).  To overcome the problem, the authors generated a 
simulated eligibility measure. Gruber and Simon (2008) implemented a similar procedure for 
SCHIP.  Under this procedure, the Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility was determined for a 
nationally-representative sample of children under the age of 19 from the 1996 CPS (whose 
family income was adjusted for inflation in subsequent years).  This eligibility was determined 
using program rules in place in 1996, 1999, and 2001—the years for which there is 
corresponding CTS data.  Simulated eligibility was then aggregated to the state level to 
determine the percentage of children under the age of 19 from the CPS sample eligible for either 
Medicaid or SCHIP in each year in each state.
13  Changes in this percentage provide an unbiased 
measure of state-level differences in program rules.  The following analysis explores whether 
physicians’ responsiveness varies with the magnitude of state expansions.  
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics of the simulated eligibility measure of SCHIP 
expansion.  Between 1996 and 2001, the average increase in the percentage of children from the 
national sample eligible for this public insurance coverage was 20.9 percentage points.  For 
states included in the CTS, the smallest increase was 5.4 percentage points in North Dakota and 
the largest was 49.48 percentage points in Missouri.
14  I use this measure of simulated eligibility 
in the following OLS regression: 
                                                            
13 Gruber and Simon (2008) contains a more detailed description of this method of determining state-level changes 
in program size.  
14 As of September 30, 2001, the income limit for eligibility for the SCHIP program in North Dakota was 140% of 
the poverty line, while the limit in Missouri was 300% of the poverty line. 17 
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where HOURSit  is equal to the number of hours spent on either patient care or direct medical 
services during the last full week of work by physician i during CTS panel t, REIMB it is the 
Urban Institute Medicaid reimbursement index, μi is an physician fixed effect, pt are CTS survey 
year dummies, and it is an idiosyncratic error term.  PEDi is an indicator variable for a physician 
reporting a primary specialty of pediatrics, and SIMELIGit is the simulated eligibility measure 
described above.  The coefficient of interest is β2.  Under the assumption that the pre-expansion 
trends in hours worked are common across all physicians, this coefficient represents the effect of 
the expansion of SCHIP on the number of hours worked by a pediatrician.  
Equation (1) is estimated for low-Medicaid participating physicians, defined as those 
reporting five percent or less of their practice revenue from Medicaid prior to SCHIP.  As 
discussed above, states that created a separate state program instead of expanding Medicaid were 
also allowed to make programmatic changes such as different provider networks, administrative 
burdens on providers, and reimbursements.  In general, these changes were intended to increase 
physician participation in the program by decreasing the difference between the public and 
private insurance plans.  Another significant difference is that in states with a separate program, 
physicians could choose to treat SCHIP patients without opening their practice to all Medicaid 
patients—limiting the impact of the decision to participate in the program.  To address any 
concerns of bias from these programmatic differences, I generate estimates for a sample 
containing only Medicaid expansion states.   
The underlying assumption of the differences-in-differences model is that the behavior of 
the comparison sample provides an estimate for the time path of outcomes for the treatment 
group had the intervention, in this case the creation of SCHIP, not been implemented.  If there 18 
 
were other unmeasured and time varying factors differentially affecting only pediatricians in the 
low-Medicaid exposure sample, β2 would provide a biased measure of the effect of SCHIP.  This 
potential bias can be overcome by using the behavior of another group of pediatricians who 
should react similarly to secular trends and contemporaneous shocks but are unaffected, or less 
affected, by the implementation of SCHIP.  Under the predictions of the mixed economy model 
above, SCHIP should not affect either the Medicaid participation or labor supply decisions of 
physicians who are already heavily participating in the Medicaid program.  Therefore, these 
physicians can be used as an additional control for specialty specific secular trends or 
contemporaneous shocks that may be affecting pediatricians but are unrelated to the public 
health insurance expansion.  The equation of interest in this difference-in-difference-in-
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where 5%MCAIDi is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a physician reports receiving 5 percent or 
less of their pre-expansion practice revenue from Medicaid.  All other variables are defined as in 
equation (1) and the DDD parameter of interest is η4.   
In addition to predictions regarding labor supply, the mixed-economy model predicts that 
the implementation of SCHIP should change the participation of physicians in the program.  
Therefore, I also estimate specifications of equation (1) and (2) with dependent variables for 
several measures of Medicaid participation.  These estimates will be provided for different 
samples of physicians based on the type of SCHIP expansion in their state and the practice 
setting of the physician. 
The shortcomings of the NAMCS make the empirical strategy above infeasible with these 
data, and I propose an alternative empirical strategy here.  Instead of using state and time 19 
 
variation in SCHIP, I exploit the fact that most states implemented their program in 1998 and use 
temporal variation to identify the effect of the program on physician practice patterns.  Because 
physicians cannot be grouped based on their pre-expansion Medicaid revenue in the NAMCS 
data, the sample for these estimates will contain a large number of high Medicaid participating 
physicians whose labor supply is predicted to be unaffected by the implementation of SCHIP.  
This generates a bias away from finding an effect of the program on visit duration.  With these 
caveats in mind, I estimate the following equation:  
                        ( 3 )  
where DURATIONi will be a series of variables describing the length of time patients spent with 
a physician, Xi is a set of demographic controls for such factors as physician specialty, doctor 
type (MD or DO), whether the physician practices in an MSA, patient age and race, and indicator 
variables for each NAMCS survey year, PEDi is an indicator variable equal to one if a physician 
reports a primary specialty of pediatrics, and POSTSCHIPt is an indicator variable equal to one 
in the post-1997 NAMCS survey years.  The coefficient of interest, γ1, represents the change in 
the visit length for patients visiting pediatricians following the implementation of SCHIP 
compared to visit length for patients visiting other specialists.  Given the large sample size of the 
NAMCS, this equation will be estimated on a sample of physicians most likely to be primary 
care physicians: general practitioners, internists, and pediatricians.  
   The inability to track physicians over time in the NAMCS rules out the DDD 
identification strategy used in equation (2).  However, one might still worry that within-specialty 
factors may bias the DD estimates.  To address this concern, I implement a DDD identification 
strategy using the visit lengths for privately insured patients to control for other factors 
01 1 * ii i i i DURATION X POSTSCHIP PED       20 
 
influencing the duration of visits to pediatricians.
15  Under the assumption that in the absence of 
the implementation of SCHIP the visit duration for patients with different insurers would have 
had similar trends, this DDD strategy will provide consistent estimates of the effect of the 
implementation of SCHIP on visit length.  Figure 3 contains the average visit length for patients 
visiting pediatricians by insurance status and year.  Except for a separation in 1996, the pre-
expansion trends in visit length for these two groups of patients are similar, providing support for 
the underlying assumption of the DDD identification strategy.  
      The validity of the estimates hinges on the parallel trend assumption.  While Figure 2 
and 3 provide some evidence of these trends, a more rigorous exploration of this assumption is 
provided by the event time graphs shown in Figure 4 and 5.  These graphs provide the 
parameters estimates the DD and DDD identification strategy for the interaction term between 
the indicator variable for being treated and each respective survey year (excluding 1993) for each 
measure of visit duration:  length in minutes, the natural log of visit length, and office visits 
shorter than 10 minutes.  Year 0 in these graphs represents 1998, the first year of SCHIP. For 
reasons described in Section VI, the estimates are generally imprecise and volatile. However, the 
figures do provide some suggestive evidence: for both the log of the visit length and a visit 
length being less than or equal to ten minutes, the trend prior to 1998 is relatively smooth.  
Following 1998, for both figures, there is a general decrease in visit length and increase in the 
probability of a visit length of less than ten minutes.  This pattern is most apparent for visits 
shorter than 10 minutes in Figure 5.  I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the parameter 
estimates on the interaction term for the years before 1998 is equal to zero at a p-value of 0.10. 
 
                                                            
15 This DDD strategy would not work if physicians provided similar visit lengths regardless of insurance type.  
Examining the NAMCS, however, shows that visit lengths with pediatricians are shorter for Medicaid patients then 
they are with private patients. 21 
 
VIII.  The Effect of SCHIP on the Quantity of Medical Services Provided 
The top panel of Table 3 reports the OLS estimates for specifications of equations (1) and 
(2) with dependent variables for the two measures of physician labor supply.  Recall that the 
coefficient of interest is the interaction term for being a pediatrician and the simulated eligibility 
variable. The average increase in the percentage of children from the national sample that are 
newly eligible for SCHIP between 1996 and 2001 was 20.9 percentage points.  Therefore, the 
effect of SCHIP on physician labor supply for physicians in states implementing an expansion of 
the average magnitude is determined by multiplying the estimated coefficient by this measure of 
the average increase.  Column (1) contains the estimated effect of SCHIP on the number of hours 
spent each week on patient care for a sample of low Medicaid participating physicians.  The 
coefficient for these pediatricians is -9.57, statistically significant at a p-value of 0.05.  Under the 
assumption that pediatricians will react similarly to physicians in other specialties, the average 
post-SCHIP increase in simulated Medicaid eligibility decreased the hours spent on patient care 
by affected pediatricians by approximately two hours.
16  For states at the 25
th percentile of the 
increase in SCHIP, the policy change decreased hours by approximately 1.6 hours; for those at 
the 75
th percentile the decrease was 2.3 hours.  In the pre-expansion time period, these 
pediatricians reported spending an average of 41.9 hours on patient care, suggesting that 
physicians exposed to the average increase decreased their patient care hours by nearly 5 percent.   
                                                            
16 While the demographic data from the CTS discussed above show that pediatricians are similar to other doctors on 
a number of dimensions, they are disproportionately more likely to be a primary care physician than are specialists 
in other areas.  If primary care physicians reacted differently to contemporaneous shocks or had different pre-
treatment trends in the dependent variables, the results will be biased.  Unreported results from a sample of primary 
care physicians in Medicaid expansion states returned a statistically significant (p-value <0.10) coefficient of -7.996 
(4.268).  This corresponds to a decrease of 1.7 hours per week spent on direct patient care for physicians exposed to 
the average expansion.  Overall, the estimates from the sample of primary care physicians in Medicaid expansion 
states are similar in magnitude but less precisely estimated than the corresponding estimates in Table 3.  This finding 
should not be surprising given the smaller sample size when only considering primary care physicians.   22 
 
Column (2) reports the DDD estimates for all physicians.  These results show a 
statistically significant (p-value<0.10) decrease in labor supply for low Medicaid participating 
pediatricians.  A similar decrease was not seen for high Medicaid participating pediatricians. 
Columns (3) and (4) contain the estimates for the number of hours spent on medical care.  These 
results are smaller in magnitude and less precise than those for hours spent on patient care.  For 
example, column (4) contains the DDD coefficient, which show a statistically insignificant 
decrease of 1.36 hours spent on medical care for low-Medicaid participating physicians exposed 
to the average increase in program size.   
The top panel of Table 3 reports the labor supply results for physicians in all states.  
These estimates involve a tradeoff between the precision generated by the larger sample size and 
a possible bias introduced by the simultaneous change in both the size of the public health 
insurance market and the different rules for the separate state program.  The bottom panel of 
Table 3 contains estimates for physicians practicing in Medicaid expansion states.  These point 
estimates are uniformly larger and more precisely estimated than those for the sample of all 
physicians.  For example, the estimated effect on hours spent on patient care for low Medicaid 
participating pediatricians is 3.48 hours—a decrease in hours of 7.5 percent.  While the equality 
of the two estimates cannot be rejected with 95 percent confidence, this result is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level and 50 percent larger than the estimate for all physicians.  In contrast 
to the sample of all physicians, the estimates for hours spent on medically related activities for 
pediatricians in Medicaid states are large and statistically significant at a p-value of 0.05.  Given 
the difference in program structure, it should not be surprising that the estimated decrease in 
hours for the Medicaid expansion states are larger in magnitude and more precise. 23 
 
   While the results from the CTS clearly show reduced physician labor supply in 
response to SCHIP, the mechanism by which this reduction occurs remains an open question.  
Column (1) of Table 7 contains the DD estimates from equation (3) for the effect of SCHIP on 
visit length.  While none of these estimates are statistically significant, all are large and in the 
hypothesized direction.  Specifically, SCHIP is associated with negative point estimates on 
duration and positive estimates for the linear probability model indicating a visit length of less 
than or equal to ten minutes.  
Column (2) of Table 7 contains the DDD estimates.  In general these estimates are 
slightly larger and are more precisely estimated than the estimates in column (1).  For example, 
the estimate for visit length suggests a 1.2 minute decline in visit length, with a p-value of 0.11.  
In the pre-expansion time period, pediatricians spent an average of 13.12 minutes in office visits 
with Medicaid patients—suggesting that SCHIP decreased visit lengths by approximately 9 
percent.  The estimates in the third row show that the implementation of SCHIP increased the 
probability of having a visit of visit of less than or equal to 10 minutes by 6.5 percentage points.  
This estimate is statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
17 It is important to note that these 
estimates correspond to the amount of time spent with the physician and not the length of time 
the physician spends in the office.  Therefore, the estimate effect could simply indicate a 
substitution of physician time with services from other employees such as a nurse practitioner. 
In addition to these event time graphs in Figure 4 and 5, I report a placebo regression using 
pre-expansion data as another test of the parallel trends assumption.  Finding no effect in this 
                                                            
17 It is important to note that the imprecision of these results is likely driven by the inability to group physicians by 
their pre-expansion participation in Medicaid or the generosity of their state program.  For example, if you re-
estimate the labor supply results from the CTS in Table 3 using the entire sample of physicians and not accounting 
for state program generosity you get estimated effects that are approximately half the size of those in Table 3 and 
only significant at the 0.10 level.  If you estimate the model dropping the physician-fixed effects and using a vector 
of demographic characteristics similar to equation (3) you get an estimate of -0.83 (0.622) that is statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels.  24 
 
pre-expansion data provides support for the identification strategy discussed above.  Using a 
sample containing the years 1993-1998 and a placebo implementation date of 1995, the 
estimated DD coefficient for having a ten minute or less is -0.0541 (0.055).  The DDD estimate 
for the outcome of having a ten minute or less visit, which was the only estimate that was 
statistically significant in Table 4, for the same sample and placebo date is -0.0018 (0.0668).  
Taken together, evidence from the CTS and the NAMCS that the expansion of public 
health insurance through the creation of SCHIP decreased the number of weekly hours 
physicians spent with patients.  In the CTS, this appears as a reduced number of hours spent on 
direct patient care.  This result is supported by the suggestive evidence from the NAMCS that 
visit lengths for Medicaid patients seeing pediatricians declined following the implementation of 
SCHIP.  The activities for a physician described by the NAMCS visit length variable are 
comparable to those involved in the “direct patient care” measure in the CTS.   
The decrease in visit length helps to reconcile the observed change in physician labor 
supply with other work documenting increased access to care as a result of previous health 
insurance expansions.  Most prominently, Currie and Gruber (1996) found that expansions in 
Medicaid increased the probability that eligible children would have an office based doctor visit.  
This result could occur at the same time as a general decline in physician labor supply if the 
primary means of reducing labor supply was through shorter (rather than simply fewer) visits.  
 
IX.  The Effect of SCHIP on Physician Participation in Medicaid 
  In addition to decreasing hours worked, the model above predicts that the expansion of 
SCHIP should increase physician participation in the public program.  There are a number of 
ways to measure physician participation in Medicaid.  At its most basic, the model predicts that a 25 
 
greater percentage of all physicians should treat Medicaid patients following the expansion of 
SCHIP.  The first column in top panel of Table 5 reports estimates for equation (1) where the 
dependent variable equals 1 if a physician reports receiving any income from Medicaid.  This is 
the most accurate means in the CTS of identifying if physicians see at least one Medicaid patient.  
For the sample of all physicians, the proportion of pediatricians seeing any Medicaid patients 
increased by 2.93 percentage points with the implementation of SCHIP (p-value < 0.05).   
  Another measure for Medicaid participation is changing patient acceptance policies to 
accept new patients from the program.  The CTS asks physicians if their practice is currently 
accepting patients from Medicaid.  The middle panel of results in Table 5 contains the estimates 
for equation (1) where the dependent indicator variable equals 1 if the physician reports that their 
practice accepts new Medicaid patients.  For all physicians, under the assumption that 
pediatricians will react similarly to those in other specialties, the implementation of SCHIP 
increased the probability of accepting new Medicaid patients by 3.6 percentage points.
18  As 
predicted, the estimates in column (2) and (3) suggest that this change is driven primarily by 
physicians who were previously low-Medicaid participators.  The DDD estimate in column (3) is 
statistically significant (p-value <0.05) and similar in magnitude to the DD estimate. 
  Following the implementation of SCHIP, the CTS did not ask separate questions 
regarding a physician’s involvement with SCHIP and Medicaid.  That is, there are no data 
describing physician participation in SCHIP separate from Medicaid.  However, this problem 
                                                            
18 Similar to the labor supply results, there may be a concern that a differing concentration of primary care 
physicians among pediatricians may bias these Medicaid participation estimates.  In order to examine this question, I 
re-estimated the results in Table 5 using a sample of physicians who are classified in the CTS as being primary care 
physicians.  The unreported coefficient for low-Medicaid participating physicians was a statistically significant (p-
value <0.05) 0.5335 (0.2771) suggesting that the expansion of SCHIP caused an increase in Medicaid participation 
among low-Medicaid participating physicians of approximately 11 percent.  This is very similar in magnitude to the 
corresponding estimate in Table 5.  Overall, the unreported results using only primary care physicians provide 
evidence that the estimates above are not the result of differing pre-SCHIP trends between the treatment and control 
group resulting from pediatricians being more likely to be primary care physicians. 
 26 
 
does not affect physicians located in states that did not create a separate state SCHIP program.  
The bottom panel of Table 5 reports estimates from the same equations as the top panel for 
pediatricians in these Medicaid expansion states.  The estimates in the bottom panel are larger in 
magnitude than their counterparts in the top panel.  For example, the increase in the probability 
of treating any new Medicaid patients is approximately 50 percent larger in these states.
19 
The final measure of Medicaid participation is the amount of revenue received by the 
practice from the public program.  Recall from above that one concern with the CTS is that the 
revenue data refer to practice rather individual physician revenue.  While there is a large amount 
of correlation between physician and practice revenue in many settings, this correlation is likely 
weaker in setting such as large multi-specialty practices, hospitals, or clinics.  Therefore, Table 6 
contains the estimates from equation (1) with a dependent variable equal to the percentage of 
practice revenue from Medicaid for a sample of physicians who report being in either solo or two 
physician practices.  In these settings, the practice revenue closely reflects the revenue of an 
individual physician.  Column (1) of Table 6 contains the estimates for a sample of physicians in 
all states.  The passage of SCHIP is associated with a 1.45 percentage point increase (p-value < 
0.10) in revenue from Medicaid.  The effect for low-Medicaid participating pediatricians was a 
2.6 percentage point increase (p-value < 0.05).  
As discussed above, in addition to the concern over practice level revenue the CTS does 
not ask questions about SCHIP revenue separate from Medicaid revenue.  Therefore, revenue 
data for physicians in states with separate SCHIP programs should not account for revenue from 
these programs.  Columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 6 present separate analyses for three types of 
                                                            
19 A key difference between the larger effects for the participation results (compared to the hours worked results) in 
Medicaid expansion states, is that the increase in magnitude is a combination of a change in physician behavior 
resulting from differences in program structure and a data reporting issue related to the lack of a separate question 
for SCHIP.  In the hours worked results above, these data reporting issues are not a concern and therefore the 
difference in the estimates for those results is related solely to program structure. 27 
 
SCHIP expansions: separate state programs, Medicaid expansions, and states which implemented 
a combination of these programs. The estimated effect on the percentage of revenue from 
Medicaid increases monotonically as the role of Medicaid in the expansion increases.  For states 
with only a state SCHIP program, the revenue increase is not statistically significant for low-
Medicaid participation pediatricians.  For physicians practicing in states with a combination of 
the two expansion types, there is a 1.97 percentage point increase that is statistically significant 
at a p-value of 0.05.  I find the largest effect for low-Medicaid participating physicians in a 
Medicaid expansion states—a 9.34 percentage point increase (p-value < 0.05).
20  
One might also ask whether adjustments in physician participation in Medicaid reflect 
changes in physician business practices across dimensions that are unrelated to SCHIP.  If this 
were true, then we might expect to find changes in the percentage of revenue or the probability 
of treating at least one patient from other insurance programs. The CTS asks questions on the 
percentage of revenue from managed care insurers or from pre-paid capitated insurers.  Table 7 
contains estimates of the effect of SCHIP expansions on physician participation in these other 
programs for all physicians and those in small practice settings.  None of the estimates are 
statistically significant, suggesting that the main participation results are not simply reflecting a 





20 It is important to note that this pattern of results is likely due to revenue reporting and not a necessarily a 
reflection of differences in physician behavior.  An increase in revenue from SCHIP in states with a separate state 
program would not necessarily be reported to the CTS as “Medicaid revenue,” while the increase in revenue from 
SCHIP in Medicaid expansion states would be included.  Therefore, revenue estimates from states with a separate 
state program should be considered an underestimate of the revenue effect. 
21 Given that some patients are shifting from the private market to Medicaid following SCHIP, it might be 
reasonable to expect a decrease for some of these insurance programs.  Since the CTS does not distinguish between 
Medicaid managed care and private manage care, it is not clear if these managed care patients are solely from the 
private sector or if they are part of Medicaid managed care.  The estimated effects for the pre-paid capitated systems 
are negative for each instance.   28 
 
X.  Conclusions 
Under a simple set of assumptions, a mixed-economy model of physician behavior 
predicts that a public health insurance program should lead to a decrease in the quantity of 
medical services provided by physicians and an increase in physician participation.  In this paper, 
I provide empirical evidence supporting these predictions. Following the implementation of 
SCHIP, pediatricians with little previous participation in the Medicaid program decreased the 
number of weekly hours spent on patient care.  Evidence from the NAMCS suggests that 
physicians’ labor supply decrease plays out through shorter visits with each patient.  Overall, the 
introduction of new public health insurance programs may simply change the nature of patient-
physician interactions—for example, physicians could rely on physician assistants and registered 
nurses to provide more basic medical services.  Additional research is needed to investigate the 
welfare effects of the program change.   
Results from this paper can help economists and policymakers understand physician 
responses to policy changes such as the public health insurance expansion contained in the 
recently-passed PPACA in the United States.  While many policies are being implemented 
simultaneously in the PPACA, results from my current study suggest that the effect of the public 
insurance expansion-related changes should increase physician participation in the program but 
lower physician labor supply.  This information should be integrated into any analysis of the 
overall effect of the legislation. 
It is important to note that this study focuses on a policy’s short run effects on Medicaid 
participation and physician labor supply.  Further research is needed to understand the long run 
general equilibrium effects, particularly the impact on the total number of physicians and overall 
physician quality.  As government involvement in the healthcare sector changes and policy-29 
 
makers discuss the possibility of a “public option” government insurance program in the 
forthcoming insurance exchanges, these long run effects become increasingly important.  For 
example, changes in the expected return to physicians may decrease the total number or quality 
of individuals applying to medical school.  While not addressing this question directly, my 
finding that patient hours decreased following SCHIP is not encouraging.    
In addition to building our understanding the effects a public health insurance expansion 
on physician behavior, results of the current paper shed light on the target efficiency of SCHIP. 
The existing literature contains a wide range of estimates of the degree of crowd-out, including 
some studies that find that all newly enrolled public health insurance recipients did not 
previously have health coverage.  The pattern of results with respect to labor supply and public 
program participation that I identify suggests market effects are being driven by changes in the 
marginal patient and not by changes in the physician labor supply curve. Since these results 
could only occur in the presence of some degree of crowd out, this paper provides further 
evidence supporting the crowd-out hypothesis.   30 
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Parameter Estimate of Interaction Term of Treatment Variable and Year Effect for Difference-in-
Differences Identification Strategy 
Pediatricians, Internists, and General Practitioners, NAMCS 1993-2002
 
Figure 5 
Parameter Estimate of Interaction Term of Treatment Variable and Year Effect for Difference-in-
Difference-in-Differences Identification Strategy 















































Physician Characteristics by Specialty Type 
 
Less than or equal to 5 percent of revenue  
from Medicaid in 1997 
  More than 5 percent of revenue from  









































Internal Medicine  99.58  45.82  2.69  56.1    99.37 45.93 19.39 78.82 
GP and Family  100.00  43.38  2.43  48.74    100.00 44.67  21.47  93.37 
Pediatrics 100.00  41.92  2.31  59.14    99.22 42.34  33.7  95.59 
Medical Specialties  2.98  44.35  3.01  72.19    0.00 46.54 20.45 97.7 
Surgical Specialties  0.00  45.5  3.16  74.6    0.00 48.87 15.65  98.72 
OB/GYN  0.00 36.46  1.12  27.06    0.00 37.65 30.81 92.0 
Psychiatry 0.00  48.07  2.47  49.68    0.00 49.17 28.4  99.4 










Simulated Eligibility Measure of Medicaid and SCHIP Eligibility 
 Mean  25
th Percentile  75
th Percentile  Min  Max 
1996   0.2956 0.2663  0.2957 0.2504  0.5977 
1999  0.4525      0.431  0.4834  0.282     0.7961 
2001  0.5041      0.4497  0.5377  0.3359     0.7922 
Δ 2001 – 1996  0.2085 0.162  0.235  0.054  0.4948 










Entries in the table are the estimates coefficients from a fixed effects panel regression.  Unreported 
covariates include indicator variables for CTS interview panel and controls for changes in the Medicaid 
reimbursement rate. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the individual level and 
regressions are weighted using CTS national sample weights.    





Summary of Estimates on the Effect of SCHIP on Visit Duration 
National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey 1993-2002 























Entries in the tables are the estimated coefficients from an OLS model.  Unreported covariates 
include controls for visit month, day, year, patient race, patient ethnicity, patient age, practice 
region, practice MSA status, physician type, and whether ambulatory surgical services were 
performed.   Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered on the primary sampling unit.  
* P-value <= 0.10 ** P-value <=0.05 *** P-value <=0.001 
 
Table 3 
Fixed Effect Estimates of the Effect of the Expansion of SCHIP on  Physician Labor Supply 
  Hours Spent on Patient Care    Hours Spent on Medical Care 
 Rev.  from 












PED*SIMELIG  -9.5702**   
(3.5866) 
-0.0818 




PED*SIMELIG *5%MCAID    -9.6344* 
(5.4317)     -6.512 
(4.851) 
N  2,142 5,060    2,142  5,060 
N*T  6,107 14,345    6,107  14,345 
          
  Medicaid Expansion States Only 
          
PED*SIMELIG  -16.574** 
(5.7602) 
2.144 




PED*SIMELIG*5%MCAID    -18.275** 
(7.77)     -16.966**   
(7.361) 
N  454 1,090    454  1,090 
N*T  1,284 3,148    1,284  3,148 38 
 
 
Entries in the table are the estimates coefficients from a fixed effects panel regression.  Unreported covariates 
include indicator variables for CTS interview panel and controls for changes in the Medicaid reimbursement rate. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the individual level and regressions are weighted using 
CTS national sample weights.    












Fixed Effect Estimates of the Effect of the Expansion of SCHIP on Medicaid Participation 
All States 
  Treating at Least One Medicaid Patient 
 All  Physicians 
(1) 










PED*SIMELIG *5%MCAID     0.286** 
(0.1421) 
  Accepting New Patients from Medicaid 






PED*SIMELIG *5%MCAID      0.3606** 
(0.1501) 
N  5,060 2,142  5,060 
N*T  14,345 6,107  14,345 
   
Medicaid Expansion States Only 
  Treating at Least One Medicaid Patient 
 All  Physicians 
(1) 










PED*SIMELIG *5%MCAID     0.638** 
(0.3211) 
  Accepting New Patients from Medicaid 






PED*SIMELIG *5%MCAID      0.5405* 
(0.2907) 
N  1,090 454  1,090 




Entries in the table are the estimates coefficients from a fixed effects panel regression.  Unreported covariates include 
controls for CTS panel and controls for changes in the Medicaid reimbursements. Standard errors are in parentheses 
and are clustered at the individual level and regressions are weighted using CTS national sample weights.    




Entries in the table are the estimates coefficients from a fixed effects panel regression.  Unreported covariates include 
controls for CTS panel and controls for changes in the Medicaid reimbursements. Standard errors are in parentheses 
and are clustered at the individual level and regressions are weighted using CTS national sample weights.    
* P-value <= 0.10 ** P-value <=0.05 *** P-value <=0.001 
Table 6 
Fixed Effect Estimates of the Effect of the Expansion of SCHIP on Percentage of Revenue from Medicaid 
Solo or Two Physician Practices 
 
































 ≤ 5% 
PED* 
SIMELIG 




-0.584   
(7.089) 










N  2,311  1,163  792 374  1,095 600  421 193 
N*T 5,439  2,821  1,756  854  2,546  1,521  934  446 
Table 7 
Fixed Effect Estimates of the Effect of the Expansion of SCHIP on Revenue from Non-Medicaid Insurers 
Physicians Reporting Medicaid Revenue ≤ 5% prior to SCHIP 
 
At least one patient 
from a managed care 
organization 
At least one patient 


















 2,142  2,142    2,142  2,142 
 6,107  6,107    6,107  6,107 
  Solo or Two Practice Physicians Only 
PED*SIMELIG  0.0449 
(0.0703) 
-0.239 




N 1,163  1,163    1,163  1,163 
N*T 2,821  2,821    2,821  2,821 